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Transatlantic Dialogue

The United States may well face a choice: either to steer a course towards strengthening its position as the lonely hegemon in the world system or to work towards the construction of a community with the European Union. Much indicates that deliberation over such a choice is purely academic, since the course towards strengthening US hegemony is already being followed. If this is the case, it will result in either success or failure for the United States. If it results in success, then relations between an enlarged EU and the USA (together with Canada) will create something resembling the relations between ancient Greece and the Romans; if, however, it results in failure, then perhaps a new hegemon—maybe from Asia?—will create a joint fate for the Americans and Europeans. From the European point of view, the hegemony of the USA is probably therefore the lesser evil.

Nevertheless, we may observe that the disaster of the hypothetical course of the USA towards maintaining and expanding its position as the lonely hegemon would not necessarily have to end with the subordination of the USA to a different hegemon. If, therefore, the EU and the USA (together with Canada) start to create a political community, they could jointly act in the role of hegemon. The initial thesis should therefore be modified: the USA has a choice, either the safe course of building Euro-American hegemony as an Atlantic Community, or the continuation of a very risky course of unilateral hegemony.

Naturally, such plans for the reorganisation of the world system are not on the agenda of any government; neither is the EU

1 I use the term in the sense I adopted in “Transnarodowa harmonizacja bezpieczeństwa i rozwoju ograniczy transnarodowy terroryzm”, Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, t.1, no. 3 (3) 2001, p. 5; the English language version published as “Trans-national harmonisation of security and development will curb trans-national terrorism”, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, No. 2 (2002), p. 139.
ready to partner the USA, nor does the USA view its position in this way. The Atlantic Community is therefore an abstract concept, maybe even a new Utopia. Reality and Utopia will each keep playing their part in the transatlantic dialogue, as the vision of an American-European community does not fit in with popular thinking and flies in the face of currently accepted dogmas. However, what today appears to be fiction can tomorrow turn out to be necessity. After all, the world system is not static, and fundamental changes are unavoidable; so one should reflect on this diagnosis of the current state of affairs and think about the future for EU-US relations, especially as there is no shortage of reasons to worry about their current state.

The newly created Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM —Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych) has already touched upon the issue of EU-US relations as the first point of its initiative for international co-operation. In December 2000, a conference was held in Warsaw on The Future of the EU-US Relationship, to which scholars from the University of Texas in Austin (UTA) and Oxford University were invited as co-chairmen. It succeeded in establishing groups for Transatlantic Dialogue, which already include representatives of four institutions (PISM and the aforementioned universities, joined after the conference by the Washington-based Center for Democracy).

In January this year, a second conference dedicated to these relations, After the Attack: “Several Europes” and Transatlantic Relations, was held in Brussels, organised by PISM and the three institutions mentioned above. In the new situation, after the attack in the USA of the 11th September, we debated the significance for transatlantic relations of: EU enlargement, NATO enlargement, the presence of Russia in Europe and relations between the USA and Europe. In addition to the researchers, the conference was also attended by politicians, former ministers, ambassadors and advisors.

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2 Ten years before the start of World War II, the possibility of war breaking out between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was seriously considered; R. Stemplowski, Zależność i wyzwanie: Argentyna wobec rywalizacji mocarstw anglosaskich i Trzeciej Rzeszy (Dependence and challenges: Argentina in face of the rivalry of the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Third Reich), KiW, Warsaw, 1975, p. 32, J.E. Moster, Twisting the Lion’s Tail. American Anglophobia between the World Wars, New York University Press, 1999.


The Polish contingent, in addition to the Director of PISM (who acted as co-chairman of the conference) and three other PISM analysts (Dr. Sławomir Dębski, Beata Górka-Winter and Edyta Posel-Częścik), included Ambassador Stanisław Ciosek (Foreign Affairs Advisor to the President of Poland, who opened the debate concerning Russia in Europe), Professor Zdzisław Najder (the presenter on the subject of Russia in Europe), Jerzy Nowak (Ambassador of the Republic of Poland Republic in Madrid), who opened the discussion concerning EU enlargement; former Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski (the presenter on NATO expansion) and Professor Jerzy Wiatr (former Minister of Education) who was a commentator. The commentators were also Ambassador Aleksandr Vondra (organiser of the Prague NATO 2002 conference), Hans Christian Krüger (Deputy Secretary General of the Council of Europe), Lord (John) Alderdice (Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly), Ambassador Geoffrey Martin (representative of the European Commission in London) and Ambassador Andrej Kołosowski (former representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in Geneva). Participants from the USA included Nick Burns (former USA Ambassador to NATO), Professor Leon Fuerth (Georgetown University, former National Security Advisor to the Vice President of the USA), Dr Sheldon Ekland-Olson (Executive Vice-President and Deputy Chancellor of UTA), Professor Lawrence Graham, the first American partner in the project and co-chairman of the conferences in Warsaw and Brussels (Deputy President of UTA for Foreign Affairs), Professor Allen Weistein (Director of the Washington Center for Democracy), Professor Michael Brenner (Pittsburgh University), Professor John Higley (Dean, Department of Government, UTA) and Professor Peter Trubowitz (UTA). The conference was attended by approximately 60 people from seventeen countries, some of whom attended only part of the proceedings (e.g. Mircea Geoana, Foreign Affairs Minister of Romania).

5 Spain chaired the European Council in the six months between January-June 2002.
6 Professor Danuta Hübner, Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry and Secretary of the European Integration Committee, was to initiate the debate on EU enlargement, cancelled her participation. Dr. Janusz Onyszkiwicz (who was to have been a commentator) cancelled his participation owing to illness, and Professor Jerzy Osiatyński, who was to have replaced J. Onyszkiwicz, also withdrew.
7 The full list is presented on the web page of the Institute (note 4).
Although the expectations of the organisers of such ventures (particularly in the first phases of executing such complex projects) are rarely fully satisfied, we felt that it as a very successful step in the process of developing transatlantic dialogue. We were also gratified to hear praise from others directed at the organisers of the meetings.

At a post-conference meeting of the co-chairmen we decided to organise a further conference in a year’s time in the USA, the first part being organised at UTA, the second at the Center for Democracy. We also decided on a further PISM initiative for the joint drafting by the four co-chairmen of a conference paper entitled Transatlantic Dialogue and its publication for debate among analysts, politicians, government officials and academics. Work on the text may lead to greater recognition of the issues among experts.

The Brussels conference helped to create more thorough understanding of the strategic aspects of the processes and events being discussed, although each of its participants drew his or her own conclusions. For example, for me it would seem that EU expansion could immediately increase the scope of political co-operation between EU member states and the United States, but would also mean that the need for institutional development of the EU would become even more important, as treaties would be required to regulate the development of the EU into a state. On the other hand, the resulting centralisation should in the longer term facilitate co-operation with the USA, which is much to be desired.

However, the relationship between NATO expansion and co-operation between European members of the Alliance and the USA is a complex issue, as the fundamental tide of integration in Europe, embodied in the EU, is not fully correlated with the defence policy integration process, institutionalised in NATO, which includes countries not belonging to the EU, and two countries lying

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8 We planned that the conference would be opened by the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister, but at the last minute we were informed that this would not in the end be possible. Replacing him with the representative of the Danish presidency of the European Council (July-December 2002) turned out to be impossible at such short notice. Neither the Belgian Government nor the European Commission provided us with any financial support. The conference was financed from the contributions of the three co-organisers: PISM, Center for Democracy, and the University of Texas in Austin.

outside Europe, including arguably the most important member State of NATO.\(^{10}\) If integration in terms of common foreign, defence and security policies is to deepen within the EU, the problem will arise as to whether a country that is a member of both the EU and NATO can participate simultaneously in two such integration processes without damaging the effectiveness of both the EU and NATO, and consequently damaging its own interests.

If it cannot so participate, the only solution might be to introduce the EU as a member of the alliance (in place of the EU member states). Of course, this will be impossible in the near future. The immediate future will unfortunately be one of dodging and engaging in careful tactical moves, accompanied by indecisiveness and misunderstanding in relation to the elimination of the sources of terrorism and the associated direct threats,\(^{11}\) all accompanied by the apologetic sovereignty of the EU member states, demonstrations of European cultural anti-Yankeeism and economic nationalism, etc. However, long-term solutions of this type cannot be discounted, while a similar concept of the EU's role has already emerged in debates on the UN Security Council reform.

One can, however, imagine a different course of events. Since the EU enlargement and the NATO enlargement increase the field of collaboration between the EU countries and the United States, why not treat NATO as the first stage, embodiment and means of Transatlantic integration? NATO would then be treated as the first phase of the construction of an Atlantic Community. Obviously enough, the Russian Federation cannot enter either the EU or NATO. At the conference, the most time was devoted to discussing the goal of remaking the Russian state. There is an expectation, both in countries lying to the west of Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine, and in the USA, that the newly-built system in Russia will make her similar to the West. However I am not sure that we have taken account of the

\(^{10}\) NATO should not be thought of as solely addressing the rivalry between the USA and the USSR If the Cold War had not occurred, then almost certainly some other sort of joint defence organisation would have been formed, integrating European countries and including the USA, as this was the post-war premise of such integration.

\(^{11}\) The typical exchange of views during the Brussels conference related to US policy after the 11th September in relation to the conflict in the Middle East. While one participant drew attention to the uncritical stance of the USA in relation to Israel, others stated that no other country had done as much for peace in the Middle East as the USA. This exchange of opinions is also connected with the creation of the Anti-Terrorist Alliance, which addressed the evident concern of certain European participants at the theoretical range of targets for antiterrorist attack by the USA.
social relations currently prevailing in Russia. One cannot exclude the possibility that before Russia becomes the country that democrats would like it to be, it will have to go through a longer-term phase of authoritarian populism, with the army as the most important institution integrating the country. In any case, although the Russian boat is sailing in the right direction, finalisation of the systemic changes in Russia will need a great deal of time. Construction of permanent and deep-rooted political agreement between the Russian Federation and the West could, however, begin immediately, through institutionalization of the grouping known as “the Eight”, i.e. the countries of the G-7 group, and the Russian Federation, with the aim of building a strategic partnership between a democratic Russia and a future Atlantic Community. The cooperation system being constructed between the nineteen members of NATO and the Russian Federation may become part of this process.\footnote{Lecture of Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, February 14, 2002, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, No.12 (2002), p. 7-22.}
