

**SPECIAL GUEST****Foreign Minister of Romania Mircea Geoana***Weinstein*

If we ever managed to do away with luncheons we would probably get much more done. Our program is now starting again with a great treat, and I would like to introduce our speaker, who is a special guest and we're very grateful for his presence here. Before we begin the formal part of our discussion on NATO enlargement and its various meanings, the Foreign Minister of Romania, Mircea Geoana, is going to speak to us. As many of you know, in addition to being Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Mircea Geoana has also had the duty of chairing the OSCE for this past and very eventful year.

Before he took up that role, many of us came to know him as an extraordinarily effective Ambassador to Washington from Romania, and someone who has been one of the great masters of the new art of diplomacy. A large part of this new art is a private business, but it has also become a public business of providing explanations to your publics, to opinion moulders and to others, and moving about in our various democracies in a way that clarifies the countries' position, relates it, argues its cause. I think very few, if any, Ambassadors that I know of have been more effective at achieving this both in the United States and throughout Western Europe than our speaker today. It is therefore with great pleasure that I introduce a dear friend, Mr. Mircea Geoana.

*Geoana*

Thank you for inviting me Allen, and for such a kind introduction. I apologize for being a little late. I know only one Ambassador who was better than I was in Washington, and it was the Polish Ambassador.

My speech is mainly about NATO and enlargement, and it's a pretty good speech, but I will try to provoke a discussion rather than giving an address, because as we all know we are entering an extremely complex and new stage of global

affairs, especially after September 11<sup>th</sup>. I would argue that although September 11<sup>th</sup> was as tragic as it was, and as crazy and as cynical as it was, it was just a pretext. This new debate about the new global order was supposed to start anyway. September 11<sup>th</sup> only precipitated this fundamental debate, first in the US and then in the rest of the free world, about what kind of world, what kind of global security, and what kind of strategic arrangements the 21<sup>st</sup> century will face. Because the ingredients for this new debate were already there.

Why do I say this? It was obvious that at the end of the Cold War, with the historic decisions of the Alliance to invite three new members to join NATO in 1997, that we were basically entering the end of a transitional stage from one system to another. I would argue that in fact this debate about what kind of European security, transatlantic relationship and global arrangements we are likely to face, was destined to start. The transition from the Cold War to the Post Cold era was over anyway. I was struck to hear the speech of Senator Lugar the other day. Senator Lugar is a politician whom I respect a great deal, and he's a great friend of enlargement, a great friend of NATO, and a great friend of Europe. He expressed in a very powerful way one fundamental question which appeared also in the early 1990s.

Do you recall that there was a discussion before Kosovo saying that NATO should go out of area or it would go out of business — do you remember that slogan? NATO went out of area, and is still in business. Senator Lugar is asking today if NATO is going global or going irrelevant? I don't know the answer to this question, but what I do know is that NATO is not going to become irrelevant any time soon, irrespective of whether the European allies follow or not, or whether the US would like to embrace this kind of global function for NATO. It is important to realize that such a function would be really difficult to achieve in technical, political, budgetary, and ecological terms.

Furthermore, we are in fact not witnessing a debate among the proponents of a uni-polar world (with the US as the centre of a political, strategic, economic, technological, and cultural magic formula) and those who are proposing a multi-polar world. Instead I believe we have basically entered a new type of bi-polar world after September 11<sup>th</sup>. On the one side I think we have a coalition of democracies and people believing in a certain type of values, not necessarily all Western, but the same type of fundamental values of mankind, and on the other side we have states which are the kinds of organizations which are basically resisting this. I would suggest that for the first time in

many, many years something which seems to be a little bit romantic - that values do matter in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Secondly, a lot of people are very much concerned as to whether NATO can do three things at a time — enlarge (which is going to happen in Prague anyway), establish a new relationship within NATO, and adapt itself to the new context. This new context means a new way of functioning and new tasks. I would argue that this is extremely feasible, and I think that it will happen. Previous European unities have been able to do the same thing — enlarge, establish a new relationship with the rest of the world, and also adapt. I don't see why NATO will not be able to make the same effort.

At the same time we are just at the beginning of a fantastic and long-term process of American introspection. I would call it the “American introspect”, a fundamental review of foreign policy which is only just starting in the US. I would challenge you again to see what the end will be of the American analysis of the world after September 11<sup>th</sup>. This love affair with Russia, this desire to strengthen NATO, this desire to engage in the global fight against terrorists, is just the superficial side of a phenomenon of huge magnitude which is only reflected in the huge trauma and the impact on the American psyche of these tragic events. The whole process will probably take years, and the end result is as yet uncertain. Will the unilateral instincts of America be strengthened? Will they realize that they need the UN? Will they really realize, with all of us in Europe, that the time of the Bretton Woods system as it was structured at the end of the Second World War is over? Will they see the need to address the fundamental problems of mankind - which are poverty, polarization, access to education and sanitation - and which are also the root causes of terrorism and instability?

The debate on NATO and how America and Europe perceive the transatlantic Alliance will be just the test case of something more fundamental which is to come. I think we can watch with great interest the kind of debate we will have, not only on enlargement, but also on the adaptation of the Alliance, because this will be an empirical first testimony of how the US is engaging with a new world reality.

Now, let's look at this process from this side of the Atlantic and see how we view things here in Europe, and how the European Union and EU enlargement will be impacting on this process. I think there is no question whatsoever that in moments of hardship the real test is that we are together: Americans, British, Germans, French, Romanians, Poles, Bulgarians — whoever. I mean, I think that September 11<sup>th</sup>

really proved something positive, that on the fundamentals we are still together. There may be differences of nuances, differences of contribution, a European unity which is not yet there in terms of the national instinct, and a temptation on the part of some European nations to play their own cards rather than contribute to a united European foreign policy. But the reaction was superb and I think this is a positive element.

Despite all this, the fundamental questions are still ahead of us. What kind of Europe do we want to build? How realistic is the natural aspiration of the European Union to become a global player and how fast can it become a reality? Can this be done alone, or does it need to be undertaken together with our American friends, as I believe is the ideal case? In other words the question is: in order for Europe to fulfill its national destiny and its global major role, do we need American help or do we need to build a new relationship with them which is more balanced? Should we seek to strengthen each other's hand, rather than having a zero sum game (which is the natural tendency in Europe)? This question is fundamental.

Another question which I believe is of tremendous importance, and will probably yield an answer to many things, is what is the DNA of a global player? Let me put things differently — do you really need to be a major military power in order to become a global player? This is another fundamental question. If you look at the German or Japanese models so far, one could be tempted to say that you can become a major power or at least a major regional power without having the fullest military dimension. I'm a traditionalist and I still believe that without military power, at least in the foreseeable future, global ambitions cannot be fulfilled.

There is another question which is real and which will be haunting us for the next couple of years here in Europe. Are we ready to spend the money, are we ready to go in that direction, or will we continue to integrate, become a major economic global power, and then relate through this relationship with our American friends? Will it be NATO that provides the instrument, or will it be just a European capability for that instrument? I'm not dramatizing the decision in the Bundestag yesterday, but if our American friends are asking us to spend more money on defence, it should also be spent on European production and manufacturing and not only on American production. The decision yesterday, and the decision to build a European airbus, is a natural tendency which I think we should welcome, even if our friends from Lockheed-Martin, or wherever, will be seeing this as competition.

Also our American friends will have to recognize, as we recognize, that they have one of the most closed defence manufacturing markets in the world, which makes it almost impossible for European competitors to penetrate that market, which is not fair. So, this is the fundamental question: what does Europe need in order to fulfil its natural ambitions of becoming a real global player together with America? Do we need something separate or different from what we can achieve together with our American friends? Again my answer is that probably the best solution, which is both politically and morally correct and also less expensive, is to stay together with the Americans and Canadians and build something which will be credible and strong. Let everybody, everybody, compete economically, and let everybody try to follow their own interest — this is my very honest, off the record, interpretation of the Lugar speech, which I consider a superb piece of intellectual work as always. [See Senator Lugar's speech in the annex.]

I think that we will be able to give the answer to this question when decisions are made on both sides of the Atlantic. Firstly, when America is able to come to a certain end of its own self-introspection and analysis of its foreign policy, and also when Europe is able to decide what kind of path we want. In terms of Romania I say again, we can do both, and I think here Poland is an exceptionally good example for my country. Choosing between the EU and NATO is a false dilemma, and basically we should choose both. The European Union is far more important because it is organic, but the transatlantic link will continue to be very important, at least for my country, in the foreseeable future. I don't see any reason for ourselves not to go that way and I think that except for small nuances the Polish example could be quite relevant in this respect.

I would also make one comment about Southeast Europe, because I think this is relevant to our discussion, and also to the general theme of the seminar. Are there more Europes or is there just one Europe? I would argue more and more what President Bush stated in Warsaw last June — that we are getting closer to a Europe which is opponent free. This is slowly becoming not only a nice slogan to win votes in the US Senate for enlargement, but something we have a real chance to make true for the first time in many centuries. I desperately want to believe that what I'm saying is true, and I think that this is a chance which should not be missed. In this respect we have to go eastward and southward at the same time. Engaging Russia is fundamentally important and I hope the current friendliness is not just a capricious by-product of the

technical need to have the Russians on board because we need to fix Afghanistan, at least militarily. I really hope that this will become a fundamental feature, because engaging Russia in a constructive way with the West will probably be one of the best new developments in European history for centuries.

But I would also argue that fixing southeast Europe, and especially the western Balkans, is something which is perhaps not as important strategically, but is important in terms of values. By this I'm talking in terms of fault lines in Europe and prejudice in Europe, and in a way this is equally fundamentally relevant, because either we like it or we do not, and I don't like it. There is a line of separation between Central and Southeast Europe which was created by history, but when you look at the overall history of Europe it is something that can be erased relatively easily. That's why I would argue that going south, both as regards NATO and EU enlargement, firstly to Romania and Bulgaria, and then progressively to the other countries, is also fundamentally important. Here I would also argue, with some bias, that the time has come for us to finally have a strategy for the southern dimension of Europe.

This is not only about the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East—this is not only about the Gulf, the Caucasus and Central Asia—and this is not only about Iraq and missile defence. There is a real need to integrate the strategic view of the southern dimension of Europe because of the obvious problems that are surrounding Europe from that angle. That's why I think going south, not in terms of the Dow Jones or the American economy, but going southward in Europe is fundamentally important, not only for a balanced enlargement of NATO and the European Union, but also because with the eastern engagement of Russia and the Ukraine we would be able to achieve the reunification of an opponent free Europe.

I fanatically believe in this idea and it is not only about my country, or about Southeast Europe, or Central Europe. I think this kind of an opportunity does not arise frequently. At least this is the lesson from the last couple of centuries of European history. We have to do it now. We have a chance to do it. It's not going to be easy, neither in Western Europe, in America, in Canada, or in Russia, but I think there is no other more fundamental prospect for a transatlantic community which will be long lasting. I would close by saying how much I believe that the contribution of countries like mine, or Poland, or others in central and southeastern Europe, or our friends more to the east, is important in this debate. Europeans are sometimes

resentful of a certain pre-digested format that the Americans are giving to Europe on many issues.

I think that just as we in Europe are discussing the future of Europe, the European Convention and the like, a similar exercise will begin discussing the future of the Alliance and the transatlantic link. This will eventually engage all of us in an open way, with our young elites, in a fundamental debate about the future. And the answer is going to be: yes, we still have some different Europes, but we have a fantastic chance of unifying Europe. Which will be a nice change after the Roman Empire with which my country so proudly identified itself. Thank you very much.

*Weinstein*

Thank you, Minister. As I said when I introduced the Minister, he is certainly one of the most skilled interlocutors between the issues that we are dealing with these two days as seen from the American perspective, and as seen from the European perspective.