

THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

Chair: Lawrence S. Graham

Presenter: Leon Fuerth

Commentators: Jerzy J. Wiatr, John Alderdice

Graham

During the last two days we've been very much engaged in a dialogue on the transatlantic relationship, beginning first of all with European enlargement, proceeding to NATO enlargement, then to the question of Russia in Europe; and at all these points issues related to the United States have emerged. So it is very fitting I think as we bring our meeting to a close to turn to the question of the US and Europe. And there is no one better in a position to give us ideas and topics to debate over than Leon Fuerth. So, it is a pleasure to turn the remarks immediately over to the Honourable Leon Fuerth.

Fuerth

I hate formula speeches, nevertheless I have to begin with an observation. About a week ago I went to the National Academy of Sciences to deliver a short speech at a meeting that they were having. And the person presiding over the meeting went through a very long list of organizational matters and had everyone around the table, and there were 50 people in that room, introduce themselves. And when he was finished with that process he simply gestured at me to begin. So I went up and said that it had always been my ambition to be a man who needed no introduction, and I had finally made the grade.

I am trying to integrate some of the things that I got into during our discussion. I am certainly not going to get into the technicalities of your earlier discussions. There are people here with deep expertise on the question of the European Union, the further evolution of NATO expansion, and on the relationship with Russia. So, I don't intend to go back into those areas. I want to look at what I consider to be the essences of the question in front of you. Now it was

interesting for me to see that the title of this meeting began with September 11th. What has it done to these other issues that might not have happened to them before?

And I wasn't sure the degree to which anybody, Americans or Europeans, would truly conclude that September 11th was going to make a major impact in some of these issues. What impact is it going to make on the further evolution of the European Union? I'm not sure that it will make much of an impact on that. But I need to begin with the observation that September 11th was an extraordinarily traumatic event for Americans. And I'm making that comment in light of some of the comments during our lunchtime discussion characterizing the views of some Europeans as something like: 'well, how come you're just waking up to the importance of this subject?' I don't think there has been an event that affected Americans as deeply as this since Pearl Harbor.

So, this is an event that galvanized the entire population of the United States of America. You can imagine what it takes to create a unified national response and you can imagine the political energy and the resources that that kind of response releases. So it is really very important to begin with a recognition of how profound this has been, even if you're sitting there wondering, 'well, why is this such a big surprise?' It was a big surprise, and its impact is very deep. Now, for the present US administration this event has provided them with what they in my opinion lacked, which is a central core to what they were going to be about during their time in office. Let me remind you that even though I may walk like a diplomat and talk like a diplomat, I am not. I am here in my private capacity and so I will be speaking as a private American.

And I think that this event provided the President with what he didn't have at all, which is some notion of what would be his mission, his administration's mission, and American's mission should be in the world. And I don't think he had those ideas in mind until this happened. I think Senator Lugar's recent speech is a more refined example of that kind of thinking. I received a copy of the speech as I came in here, and I read through it, and there is a great deal more subtlety in there than some people may recognize, but there is that message. And the message is that this is the new, long term crisis of existential proportions and that all the world, all of Europe, and NATO in particular, must place that fact in the forefront or risk becoming marginalized in the view of the United States.

I do support President Bush in what he's doing to deal with terrorism, and I have always admired Senator Lugar, but I don't agree with either of them in this respect. Terrorism is,

in this manifestation, deadly dangerous. We got into some of this at the table. There is something new here. It's not just waking up to something that's been around in its present form for a long time - this is a new animal. Let me spend a few moments on why I consider it to be a new animal before I go back to my main theme. My main theme is that it cannot, even so, become our sole preoccupation, and the sole standard by which we judge the effectiveness of our friends in dealing with their problems and ours. But let me go back to why I think this is a new animal.

It is an example of a non-state asymmetric threat to the United States. Non-state because it did not require the active support of a state mechanism, and did not originate inside of a state mechanism. It didn't come out of Baghdad, it didn't come out of Tehran, it came out of people who were attached to no government. They used the Taliban in Afghanistan as a host, but it was al-Qaeda which called the shots, not the people who nominally ran the government of Afghanistan. It is asymmetric in the sense that this was an effort to find the vulnerabilities in the American power structure. Just think of the audacity of it. You are going to strike a blow at the most powerful military force on the planet, you are going to strike a blow at an established democracy deeply stable in its methodologies, you are going to strike a blow at the most powerful economy on the planet. Not frontally, but at a point of vulnerability where not expected. At a point where relatively small force administered delivers a huge shock to that system. The brilliance and audacity required to conceive this is worth acknowledging. It is best not to belittle ones enemies. We use the word "network" very frequently, and we've used it for a long time, but I use it with a very specific connotation. I recommend that you get a hold of a book called *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. They are two analysts who work for the Rand Corporation. What they are looking at is the modern network, the formal relationships between members of a system based on Internet technology. A form which is common to what corporations have become, which is common to what international political activists use, which is common to what international syndicated crime increasingly uses, and which has been adapted by terrorism for the purpose of mobilizing this attack. It has characteristics of its own. It has characteristics which are extremely difficult for bureaucratic systems to deal with.

I don't want to make this a lecture on network terror systems, I just wanted to underscore this for you, and in the discussion that follows I'd be prepared to go back to it,

but I need to move on. The next thing that distinguishes this is the lesson it brought about the level of violence. What it said was that for this system there is no upper level of violence. It forces us to accept that if this system had its hands on a weapon of mass destruction, it would use it. It would not, for its own reasons, forbear use of these weapons. It would use them. The experience we had with anthrax may very well have been from a domestic source within the United States, and this needs to be understood, and I understand something about this. I spent two years in my earliest career in the State Department, by a fluke of the assignment process, becoming a specialist on the subject of biological, chemical, and radiological warfare.

The use made of that anthrax was extremely inefficient and highly limited. Even so, you saw that it tied us in knots. Had it been used properly for mass effect it would have been an incredibly massive disaster. I'm talking about using the same quantity of the stuff, so it's not a question of somebody getting their hands on lots more of it. It's a question of someone using that amount more intelligently for the purpose of creating havoc. And so it goes. And so one must look at the circumstances we now face as a struggle against time to uproot a highly distributed global network which is seeking to get its hands on weapons of mass destruction and which should be counted upon to use them if it does.

That is very urgent. That is existential. That is society-wide in its implication. It is not blowing up an embassy somewhere. It is not blowing a hole in the side of an American ship somewhere else. It is not assassinating judges some other else. It is possibly assassinating a way of life. So I would argue with you that this is a different animal, and you should adjust your thinking if your analysis says there's nothing new here. There is.

Having said that, let me go back to the central point that I wish to make. An approach that allows this issue to become the single and only focus of American policy for international affairs is mistaken and will weaken our position in the world, and in the end weaken our security. Let me be clear again. We have to conduct this campaign against terror with great intensity and with tremendous tenacity. But for the United States, for Europe, and for the rest of the world, there is also other business that is going to deeply influence the shape of the future and which cannot be shoved aside. In our vernacular, we have to walk and chew gum at the same time. Meaning we have to have the ability to do several tasks equally well simultaneously, not just one and then the other.

Now, let me explain what I have in mind in terms of that other agenda. During the last campaign, (by the way to cut this subject short, I do not know if former Vice President Gore intends to run for office again, so we can bypass that one), during the last campaign Gore deployed in his speeches a concept called forward engagement. Forward engagement was a civil variation on the military term for 'deployment'. And for deployment you figure out the main locus of the threat and you try to position yourself so that you can get at that threat at the earliest possible point, and influence it as it comes toward you as much as possible. In forward engagement you try to figure out what other things are going to be really significant to you, and to deploy assets to get at them earlier rather than later. To shape their effect as they reach you.

In effect this was a way, or an attitude, of dealing with what we called a new security agenda. We weren't saying that the old security agenda, international aggression, guns, bombs, and soldiers had gone away. We were saying that there was another one in parallel taking form. And what you could point to there would be something like international pandemics. HIV, AIDS, malaria out of control, tuberculosis resisting conventional antibiotic treatment, you name it, - environmental disorder on a massive or global scale, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international crime. If I had been thinking about networks at the time I would have said network crime, but instead it was just internationally operating crime, and so on.

Those were things that I thought in the aggregate amounted to a new form of threat to the stability of states and to the well being of their citizens, and it was going to have to be dealt with with a certain cohesion and intensity. But even while writing these speeches for my boss it occurred to me that these issues were already well established. If you had been talking about them five years earlier, when it was still controversial as to whether they would become serious in time, then that would be really forward. So I wondered whether there was another set of issues like this in the future, not yet clearly distinguished. And I hoped in the White House to be about to set in motion a little operation to look for those things.

Not having had that opportunity I've used graduate students for the last year and a half at the George Washington University for that purpose, asking them to work on an analysis of issues 15, 20 years down the road that will be major when they hit, and to look at those in light of policy choices that could be taken in the present if one wished to engage these issues. And I make clear to my students that I picked this period of time partly because I

think that is about the right arrival date for some of these things, and partly because by then they will be at the peak of their careers in government. And even if they don't dream of these things now, they will be dealing with them then. You can already see how this is happening. At the beginning of my time in the White House genetically modified food stuffs were a laboratory matter. Within a few years it was a major international dispute with immense economic consequences in terms of how it would all come out.

At the beginning of the present administration's term of office stem cell research might have been a laboratory issue, but within months it became a major domestic, political question with economic implications of tremendous import. Namely, would a large part of the future pharmaceutical industry of the world move away from the United States to wherever stem cell research could be pursued without restraint. And these are illustrations of how, depending upon your perspective, either we are moving faster and faster into history, or history is moving faster and faster to engage us. In any case there is less and less time to figure out what we're going to do about some of these things. I'm not trying to replicate my graduate course here, but let me give you a "for instance" and then move on.

I wound up sitting at a dinner, by chance, next to the man who headed the corporation in the United States that decoded the genome in competition with the US government. And just after salad he said to me: "I see no reason why in principle human beings should not live indefinitely, and it is my purpose in life to make that happen. Or at least to allow human beings to live for well over 100 years on the average for starters, and to live in excellent health because of technologies that will enable them to continuously repair damaged organs and the like." And I'm sitting there as the main course is served with my jaw dropped, because this man is no dreamer, he's already taken the first step on the road. So I'm sitting there and pondering what that is going to do to equity among the generations in the United States, not to mention Social Security? And what would I do if a class of citizens around the world attained this kind of life and everybody else in their billions continues to die like flies at the age of 35. So in my opinion there are things coming at us, many of them driven by science and technology, that will produce discontinuities in human history. Major discontinuities, and will produce them so rapidly that we will be confronted with them without much time for forethought. I also happen to believe that these processes are producing membership in a new polity. This is a subject of interest I think to

Europeans in particular, as the European Union absorbs more and more of what used to be characteristic functions of national governments, and even of local governments. You were born into your local community, maybe you are politically interested in that. Maybe you're politically interested in your country and then the question is: are you politically interested in the European Union, or is that something for somebody else in Brussels to take care of? If you're an American you're definitely politically interested in your community, and your state government, and in your federal government. How much further do your interests go? Is there an emerging global society? Notwithstanding the differences among us, I think the answer is pretty clear that at some level there is a new system in which people share a certain consciousness of being together in a thing which does not yet have a name, but which affects their lives. What is going to shape that? What is going to make sure that as it evolves it serves human purposes? Well, to do that you need a sense of destination. And although it may seem partisan to you, I think the last administration had a sense of destination, and I do not think the present administration initially had one. What it now has is a sense of destination entirely wrapped up with combating terrorism. Which is good in and of itself, but not sufficient. So that brings me to the question of what does all this mean for Europe? Well, I'm going to risk telling a joke here. If you go to Miami there are a lot of elderly Jewish people there, an important voting block, and so this joke has a candidate for office down there talking eloquently about every issue in the world. All sorts of concerns, and at the end of this brilliant exposition he pauses for question. And a sweet little old lady asks him, and what does this mean for Israel? Well, the translated question here then is what does this mean for Europe? And my question to you is what does Europe mean for the rest of the world?

When are you going to come out of your cocoon and start thinking about that?

I mean, you've just formed what, on paper, is the largest and most powerful economic entity on the planet, bigger numerically than us, and you now have a Commission in place which is supposed to look at what happens next. And some people in very high positions are proposing that this is a step further towards the creation of a full political polity on the continent. Well, what does Europe intend to mean for the rest of the planet? It's not abnormal for an American to ask a question like that about what the United States means for the rest of the planet, even though there's more than a little hubris in that. But there is a sense that we're big enough to have an effect on that, and therefore can't

escape the consequences of our choices. But Europe is big enough to have an effect on that too, and neither can Europe escape the consequences of its choices. So, from my perspective, since I know that you have exhausted the subject of the expansion of the Union, the expansion of NATO and so on, and of Russian integration into the European system, I decided I would ask you to think about what tasks we have collectively in terms of a sense of destination for the rest of the world.

Now, somebody was talking to me about Henry Kissinger, and I remembered that the first of his books that I ever read was his study of Metternich and the Concert of Europe. And I remember that the Concert of Europe was created at the end of a great period of turbulence, and its main purpose was stability. But to accomplish stability it basically suppressed everything everywhere and attempted to destroy dissent. Not every country did that, but certainly there were large parts of Europe where the key to stability was the police. And the pressure that put on the system helped generate the forces that would eventually disrupt it.

And I think we have to be careful that in our pursuit of a war against terrorism, and our pursuit of some new form of security, we don't create a new version of that. And there are elements of this policy which might contribute to that. I mean, we need the air space and territory of certain countries at this point, and so we have softened our criticism of the internal human rights picture, on the issue of how they practice politics, and so on. If we establish only a single standard in our approach to other governments, and that standard is - are you part of the solution to terrorism, or are you a part of the problem? - in the short term we may get what we need, which is a coalition. But at what price? We may be investing ourselves in regimes that will not ever have the loyalties of their peoples, and that means trouble for them, probably destruction for them in the end, and big trouble for us later.

So my message is that even though we must fight terrorism as if for our lives — not as if but *for* our lives — we still need the broadest possible agenda to give focus and moral authority to governance going into the longer term future. And we also need it as a remedy for some of the centrifugal forces that are affecting the US/European relationship, and which are destined to affect it with increasing strength. Our economic relationship with the European Union is in many respects “dog eat dog”. Let's be blunt about this. Does Airbus envisage a world permanently divided 49-51 with Boeing? Or would Airbus, given the chance, eliminate Boeing from the face of the earth, or vice versa? The competition is really brutal. Does the consolidation of the

European defence industry leave any room open in the end for continued engagement by US industry, and besides how welcoming have we been of these products? I don't have the answers to these questions yet, but my intuition is it isn't going to be easy to come up with answers that will help keep us together. Let's take something so homely as the banana war. I recall going with Gore to London, and we went into see someone who was a particular buddy of his, the Deputy Prime Minister. We walked into the Deputy Prime Minister's office and on the coffee table there was a "declaration" - a large bowl full of bananas. And that was no accident. It was a poke in the chest over an extremely bitter economic competition pursued at almost any cost, resulting in the bankruptcy in one of the oldest American corporations in this field. Now, I can go through industry after industry and point out that what lies ahead of us is bitter competition. And what we don't have, unless terror takes its place, is a nice substitute for the Soviet Union to hold us together. And so what is it that is going to give us a sense that we have larger purposes despite these growing centrifugal forces?

Well, there are some major unmet challenges that are too big for us and too big for you, but maybe not too big for both of us combined. I was responsible for managing the so-called bi-national commissions that Gore operated with his opposite numbers in various places, and so let's take the US/South Africa bi-national commission or the US/Egypt bi-national commission. It was all I could do to get the Agency for International Development to tell me what on earth they were doing in these countries. But then I discovered that nobody among the donors knew what they were doing. The only person in the South African cabinet who had a comprehensive idea of what was going on was the person in charge of the Exchequer. Not even his colleague ministers knew how much was coming in, from where, and for what. And this is our collective response to an experiment of that magnitude.

We don't know whether or not it is possible to establish a democracy based on a multitude of races in a place that has known such injustice. We write checks, but we do not tell each other what we are doing. We never sit down to talk about it. We never make sure that our money has a collective impact. Now, given that there are hundreds, and thousands, and millions of people who are not in the money economy and live on less than \$1 a day, what is our collective attitude towards them? Do we think that they are permanent charity cases, or do we think they are a colossal lost opportunity to our economic system if we can't find a way to bring them into the cash economy. I don't think we

made up our mind about that, and if we actually think they are a colossal lost opportunity, we haven't figured out how to capitalize upon it. But it's out there. And it's a challenge bigger than the European Union and bigger than the United States, but maybe not so big as the two of us put together if we could overcome our usual reticence and competitiveness about this kind of thing.

So, let me conclude as good professors do by telling you what I told you. Terrorism as it struck the United States on September 11th is different. It is important to deal with it as a matter of desperate importance, but not to let it displace other matters which will determine whether what we are fighting for is our safety or the quality of life of many others, not just ourselves. And Europe needs to be a partner in that process, as well as a partner in the war on terror. And in fact, there is no reason why Europe cannot lead in that process during a period of time when the United States has an administration that may not be particularly motivated to go in that direction.

Graham

Let's move immediately to the discussions that are on the program, Professor Jerzy Wiatr.

Wiatr

The reaction of Europe (or of "Several Europes", as this conference is named) to the 11th of September tragedy is encouraging. Because not only the old Europe - the Europe of the European Union; but also the other Europes - that is the Europe of the new-comers, i.e. Central Europe, and also the other Europe, Russia - all of them responded with words and deeds of solidarity with the United States. And in this sense out of the ashes of the World Trade Center a new kind of transatlantic solidarity can be born. New in the sense that for the first time the United States shares the suffering.

The suffering caused by this great tragedy brings us closer together. That means for the first time, at least since the War between the States, death has been brought directly to the homes of the Americans. Not in the geographically remote battlefields, but in the very centre of Manhattan. So, in this sense we now have this shared experience on which we can build. The immediate response to the terrorist attacks was right and deserved the support, not only of all of Europe and of all of three Europes, but of all civilized peoples. And such support materialized. Contrary to the fears of the sceptics the military operation has been successful. Maybe not 100% successful, but successful nonetheless. But precisely because the military phase of the

operation has been successful, new problems emerge and these problems have been pointed out by Professor Fuerth. Basically, I think the fundamental difference in the attitude to what happened on 11th of September is between those who say that what happened was the result of the re-emergence of a new evil empire, and those who see it differently. The evil empire is "new" since it is no longer the communist Soviet Union. It has imperialistic aims, it is based on religious fanaticism, et cetera. Something that is totally independent of whatever we have been doing, some stranger attacking our civilization from the outside. This is one philosophy. And we heard the expression of this philosophy yesterday. And then there is a different attitude here, which we have heard a moment ago. This attitude is one that of course we will stand up to this danger. Yes, we have resolution and we are going to fight back. We are not going to bow to these hideous attacks. But at the same time we—meaning both we Americans and we Europeans—we have to meet the obligation to search for the deeper causes. Not because we want to be nice to those who attack us. This has nothing to do with being nice to the terrorists. We want to be just to ourselves and to the future of our nations. To put it bluntly, if the whole war against terrorism is perceived entirely in military and police terms, as a matter for Special Forces and the armed forces, then we are going to lose this war. We are going to lose this war for a very simple reason that put exclusively in military terms, this war is unwinnable.

Our brave young people may be able to capture or kill bin Laden, but there will be bin Laden replacements *ad infinitum*, unless we attack not only the basis of al-Qaeda and the structures of the Taliban regime which we had to attack and which we rightly attacked, but unless we also attack the deep sources of the whole conflict. The deep sources of this conflict are difficult for us to comprehend because it calls for a kind of self-criticism of ourselves. The difference between the present confrontation and the previous confrontation, i.e., the confrontation between the free world and the communist empire, is that in the previous confrontation the West did not have to ask itself what is wrong with us that caused us to be attacked.

In the present confrontation I think the question of what is wrong with us is crucial, and problems concerning the social and economic sources of the present situation come to the forefront. It is true that the Europeans have pointed to this problem a long time before anyone even thought about this tragedy. Willy Brandt, in his efforts to orient the international socialist movement toward solving or at least attacking global social economic problems, was one of the

great pioneers of this kind of philosophy, and I hope it will not be considered another manifestation of Polish arrogance to say that the greatest Pole of his century, Pope John Paul II, has been telling the world again and again that something has to be done with this uneven, unjust structure of socio-economic relations in the world. Such voices were coming from Europe.

I am not saying that they were never coming from the United States. Only that they were not coming from the United States from the same level of authority as in these - at least in these two cases I mentioned—levels in Europe. I hope that the time has come for both the Americans and the Europeans to understand that we have to do something about this. We have to do something collectively, and collectively we have the means. The very robust economies of the United States and the European Union combined are strong enough to make a change in the socio-economic relations globally if we have the will. And the question is whether we have the will. I think - I hope - we eventually will, but the next question is how fast and at what cost. And then there is another problem which I will try to raise bluntly.

I understand that the Middle East conflict is not the only source of the terrorist attacks against the United States. On that I agree, but it doesn't follow that the tragic conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is irrelevant to these terrorist attacks and to this kind of crisis. At least for many Arabs, and many people of Islamic faiths, this conflict is a very emotional source of their anti-Western and particularly anti-American orientation. The question is not whether these people are right. I don't think they are right. I have so often publicly defended Israel against the attacks of her critics that I think I have the right to say that even if I very firmly believe that the other side is wrong in its total condemnation, we should look more deeply and more carefully into their cause to find out if there is not a grain of truth. Not the whole truth, but a grain of truth, in this kind of attitude. And isn't it a fact that for several years the UN Security Council was unable to pass resolutions criticizing Israel because of the use of the veto by the United States, which means that the European members of the Council, including the United Kingdom and France as permanent members, were much less willing to be blocked by a one-sided support of Israel in this conflict.

I think the lesson from this is not that the United States or Europe should change its policy 180 degrees or turn its back on Israel, but I think the time has come to act more resolutely. To my way of thinking, one of the greatest contributions of former President Clinton was his approach

to the Middle East. It was a more even-handed approach, an approach in which the President was able to tell the Israelis about the sufferings of the Palestinians and to tell the Palestinians about the sufferings of the Israelis. Something like this, I think, is very much needed. Europe, and particularly the European leaders, have the responsibility for repeatedly telling the American administration that it is in the interest of the United States and in the broader interest of Western Civilization that the US reconsider its policy toward the Middle East. Not in the direction of abandoning the Israelis. It is not the matter of abandoning the Israelis. It is the matter of applying persuasion, strong persuasion including various means that the governments have at their disposal, to push both sides towards a reasonable compromise.

And if all this is done - if we really learn the right lessons from what happened a little more than four months ago - we may really find better ways of approaching and facing world problems in the spirit of transatlantic solidarity, as well as sharing the responsibilities. And my last comment is that militarily the United States has taken the main responsibility upon itself for facing terrorism. I think this was the right decision to make, but politically the United States cannot and should not try to do it alone. The United States can win the confrontation in this deeper political sense only working together with its European allies. In this sense Europe is more important for the solution of this problem than it is when it sends some British aircraft or some Polish Special Forces, which are needed and should be sent, but are not the end but rather only the beginning of the story.

Graham

Thank you. Our second discussant is Lord John Alderdice.

Alderdice

Our lead presenter started off, I think, in a rather good way in that he said something about where he himself was coming from. And I always learned from my own background that it wasn't just a question of what someone said, but who said it and where they were coming from. So, perhaps it might be only fair for me to say a little bit about the perspectives which I myself would wish to bring in commenting on the paper. Obviously I come from a Northern Ireland perspective. I'm the speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly. That's where I've grown up and spent much of my life working. And so the Irish situation is one that I cannot help but bring with me.

I'm a Liberal Democrat member of the House of Lords and cannot but be affected by how Britain is approaching its relations with the United States and with the European Union. I am the Vice President of the European Liberal Democrats, in a very good position at present because of the success of Pat Cox in winning the election as President of the European Parliament, and in that sense I see things very much as a European in terms of relations with the United States, and as the Deputy President of Liberal International with a very different kind of relationship with a number of different parts of the world, I have once again another perspective. Now, as I pick these different perspectives up there are one or two things that strike me. First of all, of course from a Northern Ireland point of view, I'm struck by the different approaches of the European Union and the United States to our problem.

The European Union has been ever present and generally interested, providing a broadly helpful backdrop but not getting too deeply or too quickly involved. And when it comes to finance it gives relatively modest amounts. The United States takes relatively little interest for a very long time and then a particular President takes an extraordinary interest over a long period of time in Presidential terms, but a relatively short period of times in terms of the duration of the conflict, and he ends up having an enormous impact. And I have to say a generally profoundly positive impact, particularly as time goes on, but reflective of a very different approach between the United States and Europe. And I ask myself why there is this enormous cultural difference between the approach of the United States and of Europe. And there is a great difference in the way in which we approach and deal with these problems, and I rather suspect that these differences will emerge even more deeply over the next couple of years, unless, and perhaps even if, we try to find better ways of communicating with each other between Europe and the United States of America. Leon Fuerth, in commenting on the extraordinary event that took place on September 11th, pointed out that a relatively small band of people attacked the most militarily and economically powerful state in the world and produced a remarkable response, and that this was unprecedented. There is a sense, of course, in which that is right. But there is another sense in which it is mistaken.

Let me give you an example of a small group of people who made an attack of a symbolically significant order against the greatest military and economic power of its time, arguably the largest empire in world terms that ever existed. It was in 1916 in Dublin when a small number of Irish nationalists, not representative of their people at all,

attacked the General Post Office, suffering massive losses over a period of three or four days and being jeered by their own people as they walked down the streets of Dublin. They were fighting against the British Empire which, at that time, was a remarkably powerful institution. We sometimes forget how powerful it was at the time. But within a matter of a handful of years, Britain had to retreat from most of Ireland and it was the beginning of the unzipping of the British Empire, which 40 or 50 years later had virtually disappeared from history. And why was that?

Well, I suppose there were lots of reasons, but one of the reasons was how those people were treated. They were executed over a short period of time, and suddenly public opinion dramatically changed and they became martyrs. And as I sit and watch what's happening in one corner of Cuba, I think that issues about human rights and about management of prisoners and all these kinds of things can become used for political propaganda purposes, and can wreak enormous effects which no amount of military engagement can deal with. So, I simply make the point that these two things are not completely analogous by any means, but if we can learn from history, at least some cautions if not lessons, then it may be of some advantage.

Now, I think that actually this experience helps to define some of the differences between the United States and Europe, and I should make a difference between what I would call Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, because I think there is a difference in attitude. I think, and this may be a bit of a caricature, that at present Central and Eastern Europe, having escaped from the oppressive and repressive experiences over the last 40 or 50 years, is experiencing a profound wish to move away from the oppressive experience of one large power towards what is deemed to be a progressive, free, and prosperity-creating relationship with the only remaining great power. A desperate wish to be part of the club and close to power. Hence their wishes with respect to the enlargement of Europe, the enlargement of NATO, and so on.

In Western Europe I think there is a completely different sense. Italy, Germany, France and the United Kingdom have had a very different experience over the last 100 years. These are former imperial powers. They had, particularly in the case of France and the UK, governed substantial parts of the world. The whole of British society was constructed in such a way that they could manage an empire over a long period of time. Young people left their homes and went to boarding schools in order that they might impregnate them with a sense of team spirit that would mean they could be sent out to India, to the Far East, to parts of Africa, and

stay there for most of their lives committed to the purpose of maintaining and developing the British Empire. It was an extraordinary institution, and they found after the experience of the early part of the last century that they had to spend the next 50 years carefully dismantling it in a way which would not be destructive. They created a commonwealth which now has a quarter of mankind living as part of it, most of them with good relations with the former imperial master, and it was a huge piece of work. The major task of the foreign office in Britain for the last 40 or 50 years was to manage that process. But the point is that having gone through all of that, powers like France, Britain, and Germany are extremely cautious about managing long distance relations with troublesome difficult parts of the world, dealing with terrorist campaigns. They tend to approach it not so much simply in terms of getting in and doing a military job and getting out, but can it be managed in terms of peace making, and peacekeeping, economic development, building up of democracies in so far as possible, and so on and so on.

And so whilst the initial reaction of Europe to September 11th, in particular Western Europe, has been that this was a terrible assault and a terrible attack and that we understand it and we are with you, we also want to make sure that you don't go on your own. That you don't turn into isolationists. That you relate with the rest of the world in dealing with the problem. My fear is that over the next year or two a divergence will open up if the war against terrorism is prosecuted in a largely military, largely in-kind of way.

For example, if the Afghanistan campaign is seen to be a success, and it's really only partial thus far, and then the peace building and development is left to Europeans and others while the United States goes on with Special Ops in all sorts of different parts of the world, through which it will confirm an anti-American feeling which is already quite strong in the developing world, then I think a divergence will open up between Western Europe and the United States over this.

The speaker referred to the small issue of bananas and reiterated the American perception that because of how things were handled a long-standing American firm was put into difficulties, and this was unfair. The perception in Britain was that the mighty America was prepared to pit the interests of its economy against the interests of small Caribbean nations which had no diversification potential at all. Now, it's not a question of whether one was right or one was wrong. The point is the perception was a very profound one amongst ordinary people, not to say politicians. And

what I take from this is that the differences in perception between the Europeans - and I'm thinking of Western Europeans in particular - and the United States over how to handle some of these important issues, which desperately require discussion, exchanges of view, and the building of cooperation, may pose a real danger.

There are a whole series of issues that one could take up. There are extremely interesting historical explorations that we could take up as to why Western Europe has developed one approach to thinking and the United States a different one. There are cultural aspects. For example, the United States consists of people who felt it was so impossible and uncomfortable to remain in their own countries that they went to the United States. In some cases it was motivated by religious persecution, in some cases political persecution, and in some cases it was simply some people with an optimistic sense of what could be achieved. Europe is populated by people who couldn't get away from the problems and had to live through wars and conflicts.

And so whilst the attitude of the United States can be: 'if hit, attack back and then defend'; the attitude in Europe is: 'if I'm hit, how do I find a way of continuing to relate with the person who hit me because he still lives next door.' And so my co-commentator was saying that it's not enough to look at the military issue. We've got to look at the causes of the conflict, and that's sometimes seen as being soft on terrorism. Certainly in my own part of the world, when people like myself were saying 10 or 15 years ago that it's not enough to just say deal with the IRA and deal with terrorism, you've also got to understand where it came from, we got attacked from our own people as being soft on terrorism. I wasn't prepared to be sufficiently tough. But I think it will be unwise to regard the causes of terrorism purely in social and economic terms.

Mr. bin Laden is not taking the approach that he takes because he's a poor man, or comes from a poor background. The Bader Meinhoff gang were not poor people, and in some ways the situation in the Middle East has gotten worse, not less bad, as more money has come into the Middle East through the oil. And so therefore it's not purely a question of poverty. It's a question of how one uses resources and what structure there is to society. And I certainly have deep anxieties if we continue to back, and work with, and promote regimes with whom we do not share similar views on human rights, democracy, and so on. But economically, and in the short-term politically, they are an advantage. Instead we should be using our relationship with people like the Saudis to persuade them gradually to move to espouse in practical terms the values

we have, otherwise we will be identified in that part of the world as supporting all sorts of injustice with one side of our mouth, while claiming we stand for freedom and democracy on the other side of our mouth.

And we will not be seen as being people and places of integrity, which I think is important. And that brings me to the question of what the fight is? And coming from a psychological background, my immediate question at the end of the Cold War was: who will be the next enemy? Because there is such an ease when you know where to point the guns that the natural reaction is going to be to look for and to try to find an alternative opposition. And it seems to me that it turns not so much, in fact not at all, on the religious question of Islam versus the West, but on fundamentalism as the huge problem. And on the issues which Mr. Fuerth mentioned, I think we have a profoundly dangerous ground for the development of fundamentalism.

All the changes which he mentions, particularly the advance of science and technology, are absolutely terrifying to many, many people. And whilst I don't dissent from the view that Pope John Paul II is a great living Pole—and I leave it to Poles to judge whether he's the greatest living Pole—and agree that on some issues, particularly social and economic issues, he has said many good things; but I have to say he has stoked a degree of conservative fundamentalism in terms of approaches to many scientific, technological, and social questions which actually assists negative reactions. And I fear that the attack on the United States, seen as Islamic fundamentalism, will provoke all sorts of other ricochets. I shouldn't be at all surprised if in the frightening situation developing between India and Pakistan, any rise in Islamic fundamentalism will be mirrored by a rise in Hindu fundamentalism. Or that Jewish fundamentalism will be stoked if there is a sense of fundamentalism on the other side. And in the United States of America I shouldn't be at all surprised to see a development of the right and of conservative approaches as a reaction to the attack against the United States. And one of the dangers that I have observed at home is that when you get a reaction on one side, you get an equivalent reaction on the other side. And the thing that suffers is a liberal approach which is seen as being soft centre, and overly moderate, and risky because of that. Now, that's something which Europe has tried to hold over the years. The word "liberal" is not such an upsetting one in Europe as it is in the United States of America. But I do believe that there are issues of major import here, and here I agree very much with our speaker. We desperately must find a way of working together between Europe and the United States,

because in the old saying from Ireland you either hang together or you hang separately. And there are two kinds of hanging involved in that.

And in terms of the things we work together on we shouldn't point fingers at each other. We should realize we've got common problems when it comes to technology, when it comes to economic development, when it comes to the environment (and there were profound reactions on the streets of Europe to the administration's decision on the environment), and indeed on issues of conflict resolution like the Middle East. I couldn't other than commend President Clinton for what he did in Northern Ireland, and I know he was trying to do similar things in the Middle East, but the truth is that the United States on its own, with the best will in the world, with the best people in the world, will not solve the Middle East on its own.

And I think if there is one finger to be pointed, it is to be pointed back to ourselves and Europe that we have not sufficiently engaged in the Middle East, and that it is desperately important if we are going to get that process back on-line that Europe and the United States work together on the Middle East question. But that's only one of the major topics. I suppose if there is another one that deserves mentioning it is international institutions. If we are not going to work together to make sure that the UN works and that the institutions of the UN work, that they've got the resources and the political backing to work, then what alternative institutions and structures do we think we've got to head off and address some of the staggering issues which have been brought before us by our speaker?

Graham

Thank you very much. We have one final third commentator, Professor Horst Pietschmann.

Pietschmann

First of all I want to thank the organizers for inviting an exotic — like me — active historian, much more distant from the political affairs than anybody else here. This seems to assign me the role of an outsider in relation to current thinking on politics and I will freely adopt it, especially since political scientists formerly relied much more on history than today.

When I reflect on US-European relations today I always remember the relation between ancient Greeks and Romans. The Greeks were able to join military efforts to defend against the Persian East. Against the West they tried to be competitive, but they failed because their political

system was not adapted to the new conditions of an empire with a basically representative political system at the core of the empire and far reaching commercial, trading, and military control. I shall avoid further comparison with the European Union.

After this perhaps somewhat strange introduction, let me turn to the frequently invoked nation-state in this meeting. If we look to the European origins of nation-states, we have to admit that they are not only based, as we generally think, on enlightenment and the French Revolution, but they are as well a reaction to foreign influences, interferences, or even interventions. There is obviously an Atlantic dimension in the historical origins of the nation state, as can be seen if one looks closer to the reasons for the failure of Napoleon's continental blockade.

After the Peace of Paris in 1783, when United States independence was recognized, a series of Spanish, French, and British politicians prognosticated that the new republic will be someday an enormously powerful giant who will forget the European assistance at its origins, and, because of its constitution based on individual freedom, will attract thousands and thousands of European migrants. From then on Europe tried to become competitive with respect to the United States — of course slowly and gradually, the British being the first to understand that only an alliance with these far reaching Atlantic networks would be the best method for the containment of others. The continental blockade, which Napoleon organized and which had been already proposed by Colbert during the last third of the Seventeenth Century, was operated in vain as a measure of containment out of area, as we now say, of the Anglo-Saxons and at the same time their allies across the Atlantic. The "transnational" networks of trade the British had attracted enabled them to undermine the intent of the blockade, contributing at the same time to make London become the unquestioned international financial market. The traditional view seeing the continental blockade as only directed against England is rather unjust, as recent historical research has shown that England had by then become the leading power in large networks of internationally operating commercial and financial interests, managed by a multinational, even multiethnic, elite of merchants, shipping entrepreneurs, and financial interests linked with important economic groups in the interior of Africa and the Americas. These groups had far reaching close relations all over the enormous Atlantic and other ocean spaces, but they lacked - at least at the beginning - directing centres, being based and spread over a great number of port cities in Europe, North and South

America, and even in Africa and the Indian ocean. This merchant elite of very different offspring, tending toward intermarriage, shared common values and cared little about national origins. One could even call these people a kind of “al-Qaeda” of modern capitalism.

Allow me to make another observation. When President Monroe in 1823 formulated his famous doctrine, this was mainly directed against Russia. Russia was the leading power of the Holy Alliance, which a little bit earlier had organized an intervention in Spain to abolish its liberal constitution, and backed Spanish efforts to reconquer its American colonies in the process of emancipation from colonial rule. Of course, one should remember that by then Russia and Spain were neighbours — in California. From this moment, and due to the fact that Russia constituted a barrier to its western expansion, the United States joined the European efforts to keep Russia out of Europe as far as possible.

From these early times onwards very important differences also developed in the political organization of the United States on one side, and most of the European states on the other. The Europeans, under the new constitutional regimes let's say, began to socialize freedom of action and the risks of life of their inhabitants, in order to deliver them security, in the face of enormous flows of migrants to the other side of the Ocean. The United States, on the other hand, tried to socialize basic security and public order and gave their citizens freedom of action and allowed them to face the risks of life on their own, in order to allow them freedom in the “pursuit of happiness” according to their constitution. It may be assumed that this difference enormously increased the competitiveness of the US with respect to Europe in the long run.

The only European country that has widely followed the American example up to the present was Switzerland, which at this moment is not a member of the European community but one of the richest countries on the continent. To a lesser degree, England also during its imperial phase followed this example, and it started to decline when it changed its policy, although there are other historical developments that need to be taken into account also. From these differences also derive different approaches to economic competitiveness, and perhaps this perspective helps explain why the European Community concentrates so much on milk quotas, harmonizing cheese standards, United Nations climate conferences, and fiscal harmonization, while the United States' international policy relies much more on the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and similar international

institutions. One may ask whether this kind of policy is not in a certain way typical of an empire confronted with a lot of little nation-states. The Romans again?

I am quite sure that the political differences between the United States and the European countries on international affairs and multinational problems have their origins in these differences as well. Similarly the search for European economic competitiveness is reflected much more in embargo policies of all kind, be it steel, bananas, meat, although agricultural trade restrictions are familiar to the US also, especially in more recent times. The United States has even employed recently embargo and blockade policies, but these are usually political measures. On the European side, however, such policies are thought of more in economic terms. The European system of policy managing and economics has become too costly and is becoming ineffective nowadays. From this structural prospective, September 11 has had few consequences for United States-European relations as far as I see. From a practical point of view, the tragic event has strengthened national politics on both sides of the Atlantic, as did the breakdown of Napoleon's empire and the failure of Holy Alliance policies.

The United States has proclaimed a new legitimacy to define central political goals for the community of states which share Western values. Europeans acknowledged that their states were menaced by foreign-based underground networks, while the United States went to war against terrorism. The legitimacy of their political aspirations to define leadership has waned as it became more clear that the anthrax affair was essentially a homemade problem and that al-Qaeda has its proper United States connections. Europeans instead appealed for closer collaboration of the secret services and military agencies in order to get access to the information capable of justifying their political decisions.

From this perspective two final questions arise. First, is the individual political weakness and incapacity shown by the European states and the European Community a protection against terrorist attacks? And second, is this weakness a response to United States global political challenges?_

Graham

Allen Weinstein.

Weinstein

I want to add something from the American perspective, that hadn't entered into your calculations. The first thing

has already been mentioned by Mr. Fuerth. Following December 7, 1941, when most of Europe was under Nazi occupation, we and our British friends, together with the Canadian and Australians - constituting a small group of countries - fought alone to restore freedom in the world. And it was a very lonely few years for a while for us, as it was for our friends in Great Britain, and for that matter in Australia as well. But it worked and then the Cold War emerged, as an almost direct spill-over effect from the war against the Nazi's. And the years from 1945 to 1949 or 1950 were creative, inventive years. Not just with NATO, but the Marshall Plan, foreign aid to developing countries, and the reorganization that created our National Security Council structure. Similar work was going on all over Western Europe.

So, we in the democracies - in the revived Western democracies of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia and others - we were creative. We were perhaps as creative as we've ever been institutionally. The foundations after all of the Coal and Steel Community, and what emerged into the European Community and Union, were also established during this period by creative Europeans. Interestingly enough, when we came to the next American crisis, the missile crisis with the Russians in 1962, the European country which responded most assertively in a supportive way was the country that had been giving us the most trouble for the previous 15 years, namely the French. It was Charles de Gaulle specifically who said: 'It's your show. What do you need from us? We're behind you.' Even though they had moved out of the military part of NATO, the French, and the others, and all of our European friends, stood with us.

But that that was then and this is now, 40 years later. And some of the issues that my dear friend Leon Fuerth called attention to are issues that do, in fact, terribly divide us, including of course the crucial monetary issues. Whether overtly or not, the United States and the European Union have been engaged in competition with one another that often turns brutal and ruthless. This is understandable, and will probably remain that way. And that's just the price we all pay for living in free market, or social market, however one wanted to call it, of democracies. NATO is NATO. It has had its sense of destination, and in fact in many ways it has reached its destination.

One disagreement I have with Leon is that I would talk more about the need for a sense of a common journey now, not so much a destination, because I don't have a clue as to where this destination will lead us. But I do have the sense that when we go beyond the existing institutional

boundaries and when, as our friend Senator Lugar did, one talks about extending the mission of NATO to make it a mission focused on fighting terrorism, I think that's wrong. Because I don't think NATO is designed for that purpose and I don't think it can serve that purpose. I think NATO is NATO and we should admit the candidate countries and make the best deal we can with the Russians, without giving the Russian government or President Putin a veto on anything, either implicit or de facto.

And I think what is going to be needed is another great creative period of improvising on our part and on your part, to determine those countries who would like to work with us on these terrorist issues and the ways in which they would like to work with us. I think we need to find bilateral, trilateral, quad-lateral, and multilateral ways to do it, recognizing that we are, as Mr. Fuerth said, facing a new set of issues. And these issues are not of concern only to the United States. God forbid that something similar happens to one of the European countries, the fact remains that all of our countries are potentially facing this. But I don't assume that there is a single 'Europeaness', or a single European destiny. President Bush, many of whose policies had offended a number of our European allies before September 11th, came to Europe and discovered that on the ABM issue, as well as some others, the Italians, Spaniards, and most of our friends in Central Europe supported us.

So Europe was divided, but you wouldn't have known that to listen to the formal communiqués or to read most of the op-ed articles coming from Europe before that. And I think Europe will remain divided on these issues. John Alderdice is correct. Some of these issues are much more salient in Central and Eastern Europe, and these countries are much more responsive, for whatever reasons, to the American relationship, than is the case in Western Europe. But in some of the commentary this afternoon I detected a bit of 'when did you stop beating your spouse?' quality, and I must take respectful exception to that.

Others have pointed out that if in fact one of Osama bin Laden's complaints is that we haven't intervened - or we haven't done enough - on the Israeli/Palestinian issue, that's nonsense. President Clinton staked his prestige and his reputation on achieving a final settlement and did a great deal there, as he also did in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. Still there are many things we have to do. We have no policy now. One of our Senators, Paul Simon, once wrote a book about languages - he had headed a language commission - and he said we should put a new sign in front of the Statue of Liberty that says: "Welcome to the United

States of America. We do not speak your language.” I would say, ‘Welcome to the United States of America, we do not have a policy.’ We do not have a strategy. Let’s lay that out. But we’re going to develop one. It’s going to be developed in a fashion that will be implicitly, if you will, unilateralist, because it will say we’re experimenting with coalitions. We don’t know who is with us, who is against us, who wants to do what, or who doesn’t want to do what, but we’re going to go forward. Why? Because we feel that in this instance we are at the cutting edge of response to one of the great problems of the world, which is the problem of fundamentalism of all religions, virtually all religions. The fact is that people preventing a solution in the West Bank are Jewish fundamentalists who won’t give up their settlements. The people who are preventing various issues from coming forward in American politics are Christian fundamentalists. And the Muslim fundamentalists, the anti-modernizers, are the people we’re fighting against. But it is also nonsense to think that there is some single set of images in the so-called Arab street that we have to respond to. Or that “the Arab world” is against us.

John Adams was once asked who favoured the American Revolution, and I should point out that this was after we had succeeded. He said that about a third of the American public favoured it, a third opposed it, and a third were waiting to see how it came out. And that’s not a bad assessment of the current situation in terms of our adversaries and our friends. We’re not using them, and we have to use them. We’re not getting our case across, and we have to get our case across. And keep in mind that Europe is not the only game we are trying to play adequately at the moment. We are working with a China of 1.3 billion people that, according to those who have watched China over the last 10 years, is on the verge of one of the most dramatic revolutions toward human freedom in history. And we haven’t said a word about China in this relationship and how all of us can work together in that regard. We’re looking at a new and creative Mexican people which put in office a coalition president. He comes from one party, and Muñoz Ledo comes from another—a remarkable man and his cabinet working against enormous odds. And we have all sorts of issues in Latin America that we haven’t dealt with. And the tragedies of Africa that John talked about that we haven’t dealt with. And we haven’t talked constructively about what can help our friends in Russia. So I guess what I’m saying is that this is a moment when democracies, which are comfortable in their own skins, may lean back and each decide to deal with terrorism in its own way. And I hope that won’t happen. I hope that won’t

happen, because for us it's December 7th again. And we're going to go right through the period from 1942 to '45, and we're going to leap-frog ahead to '45 to '49, and do all this within a year. Mark my words. Within a year we're going to be creating new institutions, and even the most retrograde people in this administration of ours are going to recognize the need for this - new institutions that will relate as best we can and that will deal creatively and responsibly with these issues, because right now we're just improvising on an almost day-to-day basis. And we need your help, we want your help. But we've got to move forward.

And I'll stop here. I've offered another American perspective, slightly more unilateralist perhaps than the one you heard earlier.

Graham

The next person on my list is Miguel Mesquita.

Mesquita da Cunha

We are in the same boat, but the accommodations are so diverse, the structure of the boat so complex, and the social code so rigid, that we hardly realize that we are in the same boat as the illiterates that you were mentioning. Now, I think Europe is very aware it has to play a role in the world. Indeed, it is one of the reasons being argued time and again to further our integration. In reality, at the moment we don't have either the structures or the tools to really play a meaningful part in the world, but we know that one of the most important structures and tools is indeed EU-US relations. And that is something which is clearly, for most Europeans and certainly most European leaders, a very strong priority. It is one of the few things that we can seize. These tools and structures of transatlantic relations are all the more important as our attitudes and our perceptions are increasingly divergent.

I'm not going to repeat what Lord Alderdice and others have said, but if we look back 10, 15, or 20 years we are now engaged in cultural positions on many more subjects than we were even a few years ago. And at the same time as attitudes and analyses are diverging, we now have a set of fairly reliable mechanisms and over the last five or ten years, since the transatlantic declarations, I think that we now have in the EU, in NATO of course, in the OSCE, in the United States, and in the development of bilateral relations, a network of structures which may be cumbersome and which may provoke summit fatigue, but which can be relied upon to some degree. I say to some degree because the lesson we can draw from the bananas issue and many others is that we are at the mercy of irrationality, even

amongst ourselves. We should keep in mind that when there is a major issue, be it Airbus or another corporation, you name it, at the end of the day it is resolved. But we should also keep in mind that we are at the mercy of irrationality. And that irrationality can be strongly reinforced, as Allen mentioned yesterday, by the role of the press.

Against this irrationality I think we only have one recourse, which is rules, rules, and rules. The rule of law. The fact is that at the end of the day we can resort to a rules-based resolution of our differences in most cases, as indeed in the trade field. Now, that is specifically important because indeed we are quintessentially complementary. You asked whether Airbus would wish to drive Boeing out of business, or vice versa. Probably. The fact of the matter is that fortunately, because we live in competitive systems, we are quintessentially complementary. And should we forget that, the Chinese are very much on the path to remind us that there are other players. But our main complementariness is in the way we look at the other. I don't want to oversimplify the history of the United States, but it has a different tradition of dealing with outsiders. An outsider could arrive in America and after a while he became one of them, one of you. He became an American. By contrast, the whole thrust of the EU is to accommodate "the other" in our political game, in our political life, without requiring him or her to become one of us.

In the EU, the Irishman or the German or whoever has the right to participate in my own political life, in what affects me, without having for that to become Portuguese. And that prepares us in world affairs to understand and accept the 'otherness' of those in the common shape, which we rarely see. It has been stated on several occasions that the problems may be too large for either the US or for the EU individually, but maybe not too large for both of us together. Maybe this is true. But even this is an attitude which I find extremely dangerous, because a number of international developments show that the most urgent thing is not for the first-class passengers to be only recognized and listened to, but to feel they are part of the process for finding a solution, and not just the recipients of the solution. So, if I had to encapsulate the attitude I think we have to adopt in the decades to come, very schematically, I would say our complementariness is that US has to learn to listen, and we have to learn to act.

Graham

Wolf Grabendorff

Grabendorff

I would like to follow up two of the things which have been mentioned before, because I really feel that they address the issue of management of a common threat. One problem is that the perceptions as to what that threat looks like and how it could be fought or even defeated are not equal perceptions. As someone who deals with international relations, I always recall that when I lived in Washington during the Reagan years, the then-Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Abrams, once told me that the President spent more time on Nicaragua than on any other country. And that made the perception more important than the reality. That's why Central America became so important. If the American President hadn't spent so much time on Nicaragua, Nicaragua wouldn't have been such an important issue.

And I think in that respect we are always trying to reflect and react to reality, but we really do reinforce our own perceptions, especially in international issues. And if you look at what's happening now and where the sea changes are with regard to the international system, then I think it is important to try - and perhaps we can do it together - to try and change certain perceptions. If we consider those perceptions wrong, such as the perception in some Arab countries about Western countries, then we have to try to change those perceptions.

And it seems an irony to me that in American society there is such a tremendous system developed for dealing with conflicting interests and reaching compromise, but as international actors the Americans are not willing to compromise. They are not willing to compromise because they consider that a weakness. And therefore we cannot make a distinction between who will make us and who will take us in the international system. In the meantime in economic globalisation obviously we all seem to be more or less playing by the same rules. But in the international system the Americans say we will play by the rules so long as they fit our interests. If those rules are against our interests, we pick up the ball and walk away from the game.

And I think that's what makes it so difficult to combine European Union and US thinking, especially applied to international issues. Because as Ambassador da Cunha said earlier, the rules have become extremely important for internal workings, and we really want to apply them also for external workings as well. And if we can't find rules which bind us together with our most important and essential ally, then we have frustrations in the relationship, and that frustration then comes out very emotionally.

Graham

The next person on my list is Michael Brenner.

Brenner

One of the things we seem to be acutely aware of and trying to identify with some precision is this sort of undercurrent, sort of tension, which runs through Euro-American relations. And I think one of the difficulties we have in putting our finger on it, or illuminating it, is that it is not the sort of tension we were accustomed to in the Cold War days, which had to do with burden sharing, who bore what load, or who took on what responsibilities. But rather it is almost a contest, or a discussion, or an understated less than formal debate, over who and what policies best serve the cause of international virtue, virtue which for the most part we can agree upon.

Let me back up a moment and sort of suggest why it is the United States has difficulty accepting the proposition that its European partners today are in a position to create collective goods internationally, of the kind that the United States fought for for most of the past half century, and that it alone could create. As American activism over the past 50 years has gone along, it has been an expression and manifestation of American exceptionalism. And its belief and its implicit assumption is that the United States has a special calling, a special destiny. That American policy, particularly foreign policy, is more selfless, more enlightened, and also thanks to the experience of this half century, more astute than that of its allies and partners. And therefore better able to generate the kinds of collective international goods that we're speaking to.

And indeed, the record has been impressive, not only with regard to the security the United States provided for the democracies of the world, serving as their champion in the Cold War, but if we look at the economic domain as well. It has been after all the United States' dedication to open markets, in both commerce and finances, which has been the great engine of the unprecedented prosperity we have enjoyed in the entire post-war era. In support of that commitment, the United States at times has absorbed costs in the interest of the collective. One example is trade with China. In the latter half of the 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s the United States recurrently ranked trade deficits with China, which provided China with hard currency earnings which not only represented its largest share, but in fact more than 50% of all of the foreign capital that was invested in China's remarkable and rapid industrialization. We did that at a time when most of the West Europeans, not to speak of the Japanese, restricted

the access of Chinese products to their markets. In addition to which the United States did indeed hold China's feet to the fire on things like human rights, making most-favoured trade status and eventual entry into the World Trade Organization contingent upon their observing universal standards of human rights. Now, on these issues there has been a gradual convergence, and a successful one, between the EU and the US position, but there was a time when the United States in effect was absorbing certain costs on behalf of the common good and was enlisting and engaging China in an open world system, while China played off the US and EU to get a preferential Airbus contract in lieu of one going to Boeing. Again, I am saying this is history, although not such distant history. Americans during this period would also draw the invidious comparison between their generosity, i.e. American generosity in the Marshall Plan, as opposed to really less than wholesome embrace that the EU gave to its Eastern European cousins liberated from Communist rule in the early and mid 1990s. Policy and attitude has certainly evolved and changed, but I think this is the backdrop to the American conviction that, indeed, American foreign policy is more virtuous and that it generates collective goods in a manner which its European partners are disinclined to do, and perhaps in some respects incapable of doing.

Of course if we look at the current situation, particularly from a European perspective, the picture is rather different. The Europeans can point to the Rio Treaty on global warming and the establishment of the international criminal court as initiatives which they see as building blocks of a stable sort of world order, which the United States has opposed. There are also differences with regard to method, and I think Miguel put his finger on some of them. The American conception of an integrated world economy is one which places a weight on open unfettered, unrelated markets of a kind and based on a philosophy that Europeans don't accept because of their own experience with the social market, and their belief that an international approximation to it is more likely to have net benefits which the simpler, cruder American model is incapable of generating.

Other differences which have manifested themselves today in the debate concern how much weight to give to the war on terrorism and the relative weight placed on the causes and what might be done to deal with those causes, as opposed to simply addressing the manifest threat. So in conclusion I suggest we have become closer in some respects. I think it's dialogue and discussion like this one

today that can bring out these variations on a common theme, which is really a precondition for narrowing the differences in the domain of action as well as in the domain of words.

Graham

Daniel Dultzin.

Dultzin

I just want to single out one element of Professor Fuerth's presentation. I was fascinated by the way he brought us to the future challenges and what we have to incorporate into today's policy to start shaping those future developments. But he both started and ended up his analysis by stating that the Bush Administration has no sense of destiny. And I do disagree with that, and in a very deep way.

Consider the elections in the United States that you suffered, and we all suffered. Whether Bush won or Gore won made a big difference. The fact that Bush became the President meant that a man with very deep rooted interests had won. It may seem old fashioned, but I'd like to refer to what Eisenhower called the 'military-industrial complex'. It seems that it is very much alive and active and very complex, not identified with a precise set of interests. But I would like to point out some interests related to the military-industrial complex of the United States, the most advanced military power in the history of empires. For one they have a need to reproduce themselves. The interests represented by the military-industrial complex have a systemic need to reproduce their interests and their needs. They need war in the world so that the bombers can have a market, and the bombs can have a place to be used, and they can keep on developing their technologies to show on TV that they are developing more and more precision-guided weapons. And so I do agree fully with what you said that 9/11 gave the Bush Administration and the interests behind the Bush Administration the purpose that they were looking for.

They were first looking, in my point of view, to see how they could develop that shield project shielding the United States from missile attacks. And 9/11 just shook that assumption and brought it to the earth in a very phenomenal way. It showed that you don't need any missiles; you just need to take a plane from an airport in the United States and do tremendous damage. But it brought to the scene a new war against terrorism. And yes, focusing against terrorism is a way of covering the need to expand military spending as much as possible, which has been happening after 9/11. So

I just wanted to bring to the discussion the point that I think about, that we are not yet mature enough to really see what the consequences would be of not dismantling the old military-industrial structure, which is not needed any more.

We do not need weapons of mass destruction to reconstruct the earth. And if terrorists would use them, it is because we produce them. We have to stop producing weapons of mass destruction and we have to go further in our defence strategy. Maybe we'll need to defend the planet from attacks of asteroids or other menaces that we might face in the future in another way. But that means a whole reconstruction of the military structure and Europeans, of course, would have much to say about this. I would like to leave it there. Thank you.

An observer

I want to congratulate Leon Fuerth for his presentation. It really pushed us into a pretty deep, and I think a very useful, discussion. What I would disagree with is that he sounded a little bit like there is almost nothing to unite Europe and the United States, as there is no obvious common task beyond terrorism. I think this is not true. I think that while of course people speak about the problems on both shores of the Atlantic Ocean, the reality is that both Western Europe and United States are coming closer to each other. And first of all economically. Our integration is going forward and you could give a lot of evidence of this, let's say taking the euro as one example. It was believed to be impossible ten years ago that something like this could happen.

Having said that, I must agree with many things that were said here—that there are difficulties in, if you like, the political systems in both the United States and in Europe which prevent this ideal meeting of the minds and joint actions. The United States likes to urge and sometimes to act together, but they don't like to decide together. That's a fact of their life. And even sometimes when you manage to persuade a diplomat or even an administration official that something will be better done this way and not the other way, then the Congress and the American public will come in and change the course. For them in many cases other factors and other considerations will be much more important than the logic agreed upon regarding, for example, Middle East conflict or some other international problem and its solution.

The other factor is that in their military power, their technological power, and their economic resources which can be devoted to things like the war in Afghanistan, etc.,

the United States has left the others so far behind that it is difficult to think that they are very much motivated to listen to any great extent to the opinions of others when they feel they are in a position where they have to act. I don't blame for this. These are just facts of life and we have to live with them. On the European side, I think the problem is that we mention Europe all the time, but when you have to make a collective decision and act collectively, where do you go? To repeat the famous phrase, "Who do you call?" What is Europe?

The competences are divided between Brussels as a bureaucracy, between the collective EU as a collective forum of elected governments, and in addition still between the governments of the individual nations. And we can't blame Europe for this. They are inside a very complicated process that they are successfully going through, but it's a very lengthy and difficult process. Until it reaches some next logical stage, it will be still difficult to obtain a unilateral decision, a unilateral expression of the will of Europe, especially in security and political issues.

So I think we should not try to expect too much from the interaction between the United States and Europe. On the other hand, I don't see that relations are going in the wrong direction. I think the United States will have to be prepared, as they become the single predominant power in the world, to listen more, to exercise more tolerance and demonstrate an understanding of the fact that different countries are at different stages of development and different nations want to lead differently.

Whitehead

My remarks are partly a comment on what we've been hearing about American responses to September 11th in general, and partly a continuation of a conversation that I was having with Leon Fuerth during the break. It might be taken as a question specifically to him, if he wishes to take it up later on. The general comment is based on something we've heard from Leon Fuerth, but also from Professor Weinstein and yesterday from Ambassador Burns. We've heard a series of phrases of the kind that this was a Pearl Harbor; September 11th was a Pearl Harbor, and it is an existential threat. And the way it was just put to me in the break is: are you saying you don't mind if the US ceases to exist? So far all these answers are really in a way saying that all those of you who are not totally with us are unreliable outsiders. And so it is perhaps necessary to present one or two credentials before even saying anything about a challenge like that.

My wife is a New Yorker, and my daughter was born in the George Washington University Hospital just next to the State Department and so on. And Nuffield College is often regarded as a little enclave of the United States in Britain and so forth. So with those credentials in mind I considered the fact that my government, the British Government, and has done everything it could since September 11th to raise the profile of London as another potential target if there was to be a further attack coming. Why shouldn't we be among the targets that ranked in the terrorists' range of vision. So, with those credentials the question I put to Leon Fuerth was really how far can the US tailor its response to the terrorist threat in such a way that it can reassure close allies, like us, that while we may not have quite the same existential threat, we are in it too. And that we're not inadvertently creating new monsters in the war against terrorism, as it really is our impression that to some extent al-Qaeda itself may have been partially created as a side effect of previous drives to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

That's the general question. I wanted to illustrate it with a particular problem for the British, which is really a follow-up to Lord John Alderdice's remarks about creating martyrs. It was the British soldiers who also risked their lives in Afghanistan in an attempt to support the US effort there. And as a result there are three British citizens in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre. And they are there in part because our government was showing solidarity with the US. It really is a concern for us if those British citizens are to be subject to a trial that does not meet our standards of international justice. What if they are to be subjected to the death penalty when our law does not recognize the death penalty? How are we going to be able to explain that to the young Muslims who frequent mosques in our inner cities? And if we're not able to win them over or deflect their criticisms, our internal security is going to be at risk even more because the United States is not exercising its responsibility with the necessary care for the well-being of its allies. That's the worry that we have.

Fuerth

The question was put to me directly, but it is up to the Chair whether to allocate time. I would reply to that question in conjunction with the comment about sense of destination. Obviously, the administration had an agenda but what I would say, to put it more accurately, is that from my point of view it does not have a sense of destination that would be of much interest to the rest of

the world beyond its agenda. Okay, and this now this goes back to your comment, which is essentially a question about the law of unintended consequences. I don't know how to answer that question because in thinking about our own practice over eight years and thinking back historically one thing that impresses me is the limitation on human beings' ability to really anticipate the consequences of what they do, no matter how hard they try to apply foresight based on historical experience, or any other form of analysis.

I remember 1979 and it looked like a very blatant act of Soviet aggression and expansionism and the only thing that I can remember objecting to was a vote to send US stingers out there, as opposed to getting enough money together to allow the resistance to buy them from other sources on the open black market. But otherwise it seemed like the right thing to do, and who could carry this out X number of steps into the future to then predict that what we were doing would result in a new form of threat? So when you ask me whether in the current crisis we can predict whether our current actions are going to generate new monsters, I can't make any such prediction.

On the question of destruction, I have been in public debates with conservatives who don't particularly care if the United States is alone. But I believe that if the United States is alone, and if the United States does not have a sense of destination that appeals to the rest of humanity, then we will in the long term lose this battle no matter how brilliant we are in particular engagements. So, that's my position, as opposed to an effort to construct the present view of the administration in a fashion that responds to your concerns. Your concerns are valid.

Graham

Heather Grabbe.

Grabbe

I just wanted to comment on something we haven't really talked, about which is the European capacity to act against terrorism or indeed collectively as a foreign policy actor at all. I mean, several people have mentioned the famous Henry Kissinger telephone question and in some respects September 11th has actually provided an answer to that question for the first time. About three hours before the military operation in Afghanistan started Javier Solana, the Higher Representative of the Foreign Policy of the EU, was in Trieste Airport with Romano Ruggiero, who was then the Italian Foreign Minister, and his mobile phone rang. And on the other end was Colin Powell who

was calling him up to tell him, the first European, to tell him, that the bombing was about to start. And Solana said, 'Well, thanks very much for informing us. That's very helpful.' And he was pleased as punch as he switched his phone off that he was the first to know. He was amazed that this was the case. He told Ruggiero, who was sitting there, and then he called up the Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel who was, as you know, in the Belgium Presidency. The EU told him and again he was very pleased that he was the first to be able to tell the Europeans. So, you know, Solana's mobile phone number is the telephone number for Europe. But that's only up to a point. What happens after that?

You may have one person to call as far as Europe is concerned, but I think the fragmentation in policy-making in the EU is not just a matter of expressions of solidarity, declarations of support, and so on. There is also the question about what can the EU in particular actually do to protect security in Europe and in the North Atlantic area. That's a much more difficult question. In some ways the EU has moved incredibly quickly since September 11th. For the first time Europe has a common definition of terrorism, something it would have been very difficult to agree on before now. Very different conceptions exist in Spain, in France, and the UK. And in Finland, terrorism is unknown. Until September 11th the majority of EU member states did not have a specific crime of terrorism on their statute books. They had, of course, murder and destruction of public property, but they did not have a crime of terrorism. And many of them are having to go back and change their constitutions as a result of this, and it is really quite remarkable. We've also got a common list of terrorist organizations, again something that would have been very hard to agree on before. We've also got a common arrest warrant system which will replace extradition internally.

These are really major steps which Europe has taken, and it's interesting how fast things have moved. It's happened in months rather than years, as a result of September 11th. But policy-making in terms of security remains very fragmented. There are security tasks scattered across the EU's institutions and policies, and of course in the member states as well. For instance, the EU now has police cooperation in one form or another. A lot of it has to do with anti-terrorism in all three of its so-called 'pillars': in its common foreign and security policy, in its justice and home affairs cooperation, and in its institutions which are in its first pillar. And NATO is doing policing too in the Balkans.

So, these are very fragmented. How much do these groups talk to one another? It's not clear that just because everybody may be discussing these things in Brussels, they are actually talking to one another. The Interior Ministers meet in their Council, the Foreign Ministers meet in another, and NATO in a third. So I think the problem is with coordination. We certainly need a multi-level response, as my neighbour very rightly pointed out, but we need one that is coordinated in terms of tracing networks, in terms of finding terrorist cells. And the EU is not terribly good at this. Europe is very good at multi-level governments but that reduces its abilities to knit together its policies. That matters for the United States in terms of using Europe, i.e. the EU, as a partner. It also matters very much for the security of European citizens, who are hoping that all of these transnational and international and European institutions can work together.

But my final point concerns NATO and how much can NATO take on this role as well, because that's tending to be what's happening in Europe. It's well-known that the EU started off with economics. It has gradually moved over the past decades into other areas, but it has tended to leave security to NATO. Now we're developing much faster with a European security and defence policy, but I think NATO also is going to have to start to change its role. I mean, we had Senator Lugar's very interesting speech on the argument for having NATO being a globo-cop of some kind. There are many Europeans who think that NATO should play a role of simply securing Europe. Certainly Article 5 is not quite what we thought and both Europeans and Americans are questioning the role of NATO in facing security challenges.

If I may speak such heresy to some of you in this room, it seems to me that in just structural terms NATO is not a particularly useful alliance in this respect, for two reasons. One is that it is a very bureaucratic structure. Look at the institutions in Brussels—how slowly they work and the enormous proxy which goes on in NATO. Things are fine if you have very strong, tough NATO leadership. It's not so easy when you have a very fragmented and diffuse threat. We're good at deciding on Article 5 type actions, fine. We did that actually on September 12th very quickly, but in terms of deciding which countries are going to bear the burden of which tasks, how much money they're going to put into different kinds of counter-terrorism, that is going to be much harder to deal with. And secondly, it is tricky because the members of the Alliance have increasingly differentiated perceptions of security. Everybody agrees

that new security threats are as important as the old, but tanks and missiles are not the only things to look at. We also have to look at cross-water crime and so on, but very different views persist on what is a terrorist. We have Turkey, for example, whose Foreign Minister said shortly after September 11th that the Alliance really ought to take care of terrorists on NATO territory, such as the Kurds. You know, that's not something other members of the Alliance could deal with. So I think the question of Europe's capacity to act lies in the members states, it lies in the EU level, and it lies within NATO as well. Thank you.

Graham

Allen Weinstein

Weinstein

I'd like to take a minute to respond to Laurence Whitehead's comment. If I understood him correctly, it was apparently directed against Americans who had taken Europeans to task if they did not share every jot and tittle of US foreign policy as it stands at the moment on the issue of the war against terrorism. And Laurence took the time to recite some of his credentials as a friend of the United States, which he need not have done for my benefit nor do I think any one around this table would question them, but he did. So too I've been accused of many things in my life, some rather uglier than others, but I don't think I've ever been accused before of having been anti-European, or anti-Atlanticist, and I'll have to write that one down. Thank you, Laurence. Because to someone who spends about a quarter of every year in Europe, and who has worked for 20 years in a variety of capacities in a cooperative transatlantic manner, it is a singular allegation. I think what I would plead guilty to, however, is a sense that sometimes some of our European friends have even thinner skins than we do about comments back and forth, (and so do our Mexican friends, but that's another story). One comment that was made in this very interesting debate was that the United States has to learn to listen. We absolutely do. We don't do it well enough.

I also appreciate Ambassador Kolosovsky's point that although we may like to act together with our friends in Europe, we don't like to decide together, which is another absolutely right, correct, and appropriate point. I'm not certain I would plead guilty to the notion that foreign policy for the last 50 years has been governed by the concept of American exceptionalism, but that would be another debate. And I certainly do not agree that

Americans have basically, persistently, or continuously broken the rules of engagement in dealing with European allies. One can go through the history of the 1990s and our particular troubles in the Balkans and decide who was breaking which rules and when, but that's for another day as well. So it seems like we're laying our cards on the table, and discovering essentially that nobody has an adequate hand. And the question then becomes what do we do? Maybe we're playing the wrong game with one another, or maybe we have to invent yet another set of games, which was the only point I was making earlier. But Laurence, just to assure you, some of my best friends are Englishmen.

Graham

Let me suggest that a way to bring our session to a close is to come back to those who led the discussion in this last part of the day, Jerzy Wiatr, John Alderdice, Horst Pietschmann, and finally Leon Fuerth. Would any of you care to make a final set of remarks?

Wiatr

My main impression from this discussion is that we are as a group ahead of the dominant common thinking, both among politicians and among the general public. And if that is so, it is the right place to be ahead of the dominant mode, and hopefully we are not only ahead, but also in a position which ultimately will be accepted more broadly, both by the public and especially by the leaders of our nations.

Alderdice

My understanding was that the purposes of those of you who established the previous conference and this one was to create a possible process to facilitate transatlantic discussion, I think what the last couple of days, and especially the last couple of hours, have demonstrated is that this is a very important commitment on your part. Certainly, the debate has been lively and we've touched on issues where we all know we don't have all the answers, and it's not easy to hear different views that are challenging to your own perspective even though we know that while we are on opposite sides of the Atlantic, we are on the same side of the argument for a better, safer world. And I would simply want to emphasize my own view of the tremendous importance of engaging Europeans and Americans in serious discussion with each other in an attempt to understand the very different historical and political perspectives that we're coming from. Because if we don't do

that, we will certainly end up fighting with each other, even when fundamentally we're not trying to achieve different things. We're simply taking different approaches to try to achieve those ends.

Graham

Horst Pietschmann.

Pietschmann

Well, I largely agree with Professor Weinstein that the new situation requires new mechanisms for dealing with it. Of course NATO is as it is and it should remain like it is, but for the challenge of terrorism we need new instruments. On the one hand we need instruments to manage the terrorist problem—be they political, military, or defensive; but at the same time I think the Europeans should learn a lot from the United States, in particular that global problems are really behind these new challenges, which became more autonomous since 1989 when the East-West-confrontation and the threat of atomic war ended. These problems are only capable of being managed by international consulting and trouble-shooting agencies, which therefore should be sustained, consolidated and developed further, be they institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the UN Security Council, or regional political and military organizations.

And in this respect one has to argue that United States should learn that these institutions to manage globalisation or other world problems should be more just and have more distributive justice even against countries. Only in this way will it be possible to slowly reduce the deeply rooted aggressiveness that one can observe, for example, among many of the Arabian or Islamic countries against the West. Huntington's prognostics are impossible to avoid by national or imperial politics—the Roman case again might be suitable for learning.

Graham

Leon Fuerth.

Fuerth

The differences that this discussion reveals are certainly important and they obviously need to be addressed both in and out of government. But since I think I have either the last remark or the next to the last remark (if the Chairman has that), it is fitting to observe that this discussion, taking place in an atmosphere of considerably shared

experience, mutual confidence, and esteem, is illustrative of the fundamental strength of the system of relationships that we have created and sustained to this point. There are very few precedents if any, in history, of relationships of this order existing among sovereign states. It's a very precious thing.